Film, Television and Music Production Law Blog

Does Interference with Someone Filming a Documentary About Police Interaction with Gang Members in Public Violate the Rights Afforded to that Person Under the NJ or the U.S. Constitutions?

In September 2012, the Appellate Court of New Jersey held that “the right to engage in news gathering for the purposes of creating a documentary concerning a matter of public interest is protected by the First Amendment and the New Jersey Constitution . .  . .” Ramos v. Flowers, No. A-4910-10T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. September 21, 2012).

In that case, a documentary filmmaker (“Plaintiff”) was working on a project about gangs in Trenton, New Jersey.  On several occasions, a police officer (“Defendant”) made Plaintiff stop filming public encounters between the police and gang members. Id. at 17-19.  For example, on one occasion Plaintiff went to the Trenton Public Library to film a police investigation regarding a meeting between gang members on its premises. Id. When Defendant noticed he was filming, Defendant took his camera from him and put it in his police vehicle. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant threatened to lock him up if Defendant saw him again.  Id. at 18.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division (“Lower Court”). Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Defendant interfered with his free speech rights under both the New Jersey (“State”)  and United States (“U.S.”) Constitution.  Id. at 19. In response to his complaint, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment allows a court to determine the outcome of a case without proceeding to trial. Basically, it may be granted when it was clear to the court, based upon the pleadings (e.g. complaint and answer), that there is no issue of material fact and judgment can be determined as a matter of law.  The Lower Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment resulting in a dismissal of Plaintiff’s case before it could proceed to trial. Plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division (“Court”).

First, the Court addressed the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states in part,

Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const. amend. l; Id. at 24.

The Court cited cases standing for the proposition that the First Amendment protects the media’s right to gather news.  Otherwise the freedom of press could be severely deprived of its essential purpose.  Id. at 24-25. For example, one purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the right to receive information. This includes the right to gather news from any source by means within the law.  Id. at 30.

Next, the Court addressed Plaintiff’s claim based on the New Jersey State Constitution, which states, 

Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.  No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.

N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 6; Id. at 25.

The people have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances.

N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 18; Id.

Citing those provisions, the Court noted that the State Constitution provided broader protection for freedom of speech than the U.S. Constitution. Further, it observed that the freedom of press is strongly protected under the State Constitution. Id. at 25-26. It explained that a documentary about a subject of public interest, such as urban gangs, was a form of investigative journalism, and the process of preparing such a documentary was a form of news gathering. Thus, as a recognized form of journalism, a documentary is entitled to the strong protection afforded to the press.  Id.

In support of that proposition, the Court elaborated that the filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities, fits comfortably within those principles.  Gathering information about government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal constitutional interest in protecting and promoting the free discussion of governmental affairs. Id. at 30. Accordingly, those activities are protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New Jersey State Constitution. Id. at 26.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the Lower Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. However, it did note that Plaintiff’s activity was subject to reasonable place, time and manner restrictions, as long as the restrictions were: content neutral; narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and left open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Id. at 32.  

May a Principal Officer be Held Liable for Corporate Actions?

Should a principal corporate officer be able to avail himself of the corporation’s liability shield which would protect his personal assets from suits arising from actions taken in his corporate capacity? When should a principal officer be held liable for the actions of a corporation based on the principle that the corporation is merely a façade in order to protect the officer from personal liability? These questions were addressed in the recent New York case, Deborah S. Carlone v. The Lion & The Bull Films, Inc. et al., 10 Civ. 6275 (S.D. N.Y. Apr 30, 2012).

The initial holding in that case was that the corporate defendant, L&B Films (“L&B” or “Defendant”), breached its contract with the plaintiff, Deborah Carlone (“Carlone” or “Plaintiff”). The factual basis of that holding was as follows. Plaintiff lent $115,000.00 to L&B for the purpose of making a motion picture.  The loan needed to be made rapidly, without the normal document review. As an incentive, L&B promised Carlone that the principal loan amount of $115,000.00 would be repaid within 30 days, along with an additional $185,000.00.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendant because she had not received any of the repayment. Carlone prevailed against L&B Films in her claim for breach of contract. Accordingly, she was awarded $300,000.00 plus prejudgment interest. Subsequently, Carlone sought to hold Mr. Luna, the principal officer, director and 50% shareholder of L&B, personally liable for the judgment by piercing the corporate veil.

New York law establishes two requirements for piercing the corporate veil and thus holding an individual liable for corporate action:

1)      the owner exercised complete domination over the corporation with respect to the transaction at issue; and

2)      such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong that injures the party seeking to pierce the veil.

MAG Portfolio Consultant, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed Group LLC, 268 F .3d 58 (2d Cir. 2001).

Courts consider the following factors when determining whether it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil:

1)      the absence of the formalities and paraphernalia that are part and parcel of the corporate existence, i.e. issuance of stock, election of directors, keeping of corporate records and the like;

2)      inadequate capitalization;

3)      whether funds are put in, and taken out of, the corporation for personal rather than corporate purposes;

4)      overlap in ownership, officers, directors, and personnel;

5)      common office space, address and telephone numbers of corporate entities;

6)      the amount of business discretion displayed by the allegedly dominated corporation;

7)      whether the related corporations deal with the dominated corporation at arms-length;

8)      whether the corporations are treated as independent profit centers;

9)      the payment or guarantee of debts of the dominated corporation by other corporations in the group; and

10)     whether the corporation in question had property that was used by other of the    corporations as if it were its own. 

William Passalcqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F. 2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1991).

The District Court applied the factors set forth above to the facts of this case. L&B Films was exceedingly undercapitalized, having only $50.00, when it was formed.  Other than the money it had received from the Plaintiff, the corporation had no other assets nor did it conduct any other business during its existence. Additionally, it did not have corporate headquarters; it conducted business out of Luna’s residence. The sole officers of the corporation were Luna’s and his partner Mr. Pereyra. The meetings between them were informal; there were no formal board meetings at which minutes were kept. There was no evidence of any exercise of discretion by L&B that was independent of Luna’s discretion.  Furthermore, Luna used his control of L&B to effect the entering into the agreement with the Plaintiff.

On this basis, the Court held that it was proper to pierce the corporate veil in order to hold Luna personally liable for the award against L&B Films because Luna completely controlled and dominated the corporation.

Creating a corporate entity will not always protect you from being personally liable for corporate actions. It is important to keep Carlone factors in mind when conducting business through an entity. 

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Is a Broadcast Television Network Liable When it Broadcasts an Alleged False Story about Someone Without Verifying the Validity of the Statements?

According to a pending California lawsuit, the  American Broadcasting Companies (“ABC”) published an allegedly false depiction of Colorado resident David Williams’ (“Williams”) online relationship with former lover Kelley Cahill (“Kelley”) on its news show “20/20”.  Williams filed a lawsuit in the beginning of 2012 claiming defamation.

Williams filed that suit in Orange County California Superior Court and named as defendants ABC, Kelley, “20/20” presenter Christopher Cuomo (“Cuomo’) and “20/20” editor Jack Pyle (“Pyle”). Williams’ complaint stated that ABC failed to “engage in any, or any meaningful, research to determine whether [Kelley] was being truthful, and failed to give Williams any, or any adequate, opportunity to rebut [Kelley’s] allegations treating her story objectively.”  Williams requested a jury trial for libel and he claimed a publication of private facts, intrusion and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

“20/20” aired the show entitled “Blinded by Love: Kelley Cahill’s Ordeal” on June 24, 2011, and Williams claimed the show falsely portrayed him as an online dating predator and a villain, and portrayed Kelley as a victim.  Specifically, the show mentioned that Williams lied to Kelley about his marital status, and that Kelley had incurred increasing debt because of all the gifts she gave to Williams.  Further, the show mentioned that Williams preyed on a massive amount of women.  

 Kelley posted similar statements on different websites and ABC made the show continuously available to the public online at the network.  Williams contended that Kelley knew that he was separated from his wife during the time they were dating, and that he bought Kelley lavish gifts.  It was alleged that Kelley chose to broadcast a fictitious version of their relationship to promote iCheckmates.com, Kelley’s business that enables subscribers to obtain a background check of people they meet online.

The complaint also stated that Cuomo falsely mentioned on the show that Williams declined to comment.  Williams asserted that when he was first contacted by ABC he told them to look at public records to uncover the truth.  Williams also claimed that he did not offer a statement to ABC because he did not have enough time to consult with his attorney before the show aired. 

What the outcome of the dispute will be is unknown.

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Is a Face Tattoo Displayed on a Character in a Film Protected Under the Copyright Law?

The Eastern District of Missouri recently denied a tattoo artist’s request for a preliminary injunction against Warner Brothers’ release of the Hangover II.  Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., 11-cv-00752 (E.D. Mo. April 28, 2011). 

In that case, artist S. Victor Whitmill (“Victor”), creator of Mike Tyson’s face tattoo, filed a lawsuit against Warner Brothers Entertainment Inc. (“Warner Brothers”) for not seeking his approval to use the tattoo design on the face of another character in the movie.  Victor had obtained a release from Mike Tyson after creating the tattoo and neither Tyson nor Warner Brothers sought his approval.  The movie used the tattoo design on another character’s face in a majority of the scenes.

In ruling, the judge examined four factors:

1) plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits;

2) whether plaintiff was threatened with irreparable harm;

3) the balance of the equities; and

4) the public interest.

The Judge felt that Victor had a strong likelihood of prevailing and that he had suffered irreparable harm because he lost control over the tattoo image.  However, the balance of equities and public interest favored Warner Brothers.  The judge found that Warner Brother’s harm outweighed Victor’s because Warner Brothers would lose millions if the movie was enjoined as compared to Victor’s loss of one tattoo design that would not affect his entire business.  Further, the public’s desire to see the movie was considered and it was determined that non-parties such as theater owners and distributors would also lose money and be affected. Ultimately, all the factors considered as a whole were tipped in favor of Warner Brothers although the Judge reasoned that Victor would probably win the case.

Early this year, the case was settled.  The terms of the settlement were kept confidential, but Warner Brothers did mention that it will not have to digitally alter the film for the DVD release, as was previously considered.  

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When is a Breach of Contract Claim in NY Preempted by the Copyright Act?

What state law claims are preempted by the federal law embodied in the Copyright Act?  This question was recently addressed in Stadt v. Fox News Network LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

In that case, Kenneth Stadt (“Stadt”), a video owner, filed a lawsuit against Fox News Network (“Fox”), a cable television network, for among other things, copyright infringement and breach of contract.  Stadt was the exclusive owner of a video that he registered with the United States Copyright Office that depicts a famous couple on vacation (“Video”).  Stadt and Fox entered into a written License Agreement (“Agreement”) in which Fox was given the sole right to air the Video on its network within a one month period.  See Id. at 316.

Stadt alleged that Fox promised to stop using the Video upon expiration of the License, and in exchange for that promise Stadt allowed Fox to broadcast the Video with a “Fox Business Exclusive” credit on the screen. However, Stadt claimed that Fox continued to make use of the Video and credit after the Agreement expired.  Fox moved to dismiss all the claims except the copyright claim, stating that “the claims are preempted by section 301 of Title 17 of the United States Code (the Copyright Act), fail to state a claim as a matter of law, or both.” Id. at 315.

The Court relied on Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2004) to determine when the Copyright Act shall preempt state law. Id. at 317.  In Briarpatch, the Second Circuit held that the Copyright Act exclusively governs a claim when:

(1) the particular work to which the claim is being applied falls within the type of works protected by the Copyright Act . . .; and

(2) the claim seeks to vindicate legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to one of the bundle of exclusive rights already protected by copyright law....

See Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2004).

The Briarpatch Court further stated that the first prong of this test is called the “subject matter requirement,” and the second prong is called the “general scope requirement.”  The general scope requirement is satisfied only when the state-created right may be abridged by an act that would, by itself, infringe one of the exclusive rights provided by federal copyright law.  The state law claim must not include any extra elements that make it qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim.  Additionally, the Briarpatch Court explained that to determine whether a claim is qualitatively different, it will look at “what [the] plaintiff seeks to protect, the theories in which the matter is thought to be protected and the rights sought to be enforced.” Stadt, 719 F.Supp.2d at 317-18 (citing Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2004)).

The Stadt Court stated that it takes a ‘restrictive view’ of what qualifies as an extra element sufficient to shield the claim from copyright preemption.  Nevertheless, ‘a state law claim is qualitatively different if it requires such elements as breach of fiduciary duty, or possession and control of chattels.” Stadt, 719 F.Supp.2d at 318. 

To establish breach of contract in New York, a plaintiff must 1) confirm the existence of an agreement; 2) show that plaintiff has adequately performed pursuant to that contract; 3) show that the accused has breached the contract; and 4) show that there are damages.  See Id. 

The Stadt Court found that the “subject matter” requirement for federal preemption to apply was met because the subject matter of Stadt’s breach of contract claim related to the continued use of a video that was governed by the Copyright Act.  However, the “general scope” requirement was not satisfied because Stadt’s claim that Fox continued to make use of the credit following expiration of the Agreement added an “extra element that render[ed Stadt’s] breach of contract claim qualitatively different from a claim for copyright infringement.” Hence, that additional aspect of the claim was not governed by the Copyright Act.  Id. at 320-21.  In other words, the additional allegation of continued use of the credit went beyond what the Copyright Act governs and therefore survives preemption.  See Id. at 321.  Ultimately, the Stadt Court denied Fox’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim since only part of the claim was preempted by the Copyright Act.  See Id. at 324.

The preemption of state laws by the Copyright Act is an issue every claimant should be aware of when preparing causes of actions for a complaint involving intellectual property matters.  One should take heed of the two-step prong courts rely on in evaluating when claims meet the criteria for preemption.

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Does the Discovery Rule Apply to Copyright Infringement?

In Urbont v. Sony Music Entertainment, No. 11 Civ. 4516 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2012), the federal District Court for the Southern District of New York was presented with the question of whether the discovery rule applies to causes of action under the Copyright Act. 

The discovery rule allows parties to extend a statute of limitations because they did not have reason to know, nor did they know, that they had a potential cause of action.  In this case, application of the discovery rule would have extended the three (3) year statute of limitations under the Copyright Act for infringement. 

The court determined that the discovery rule would not apply here because there was no evidence of material concealment of the fraud that led to the alleged infringement.  Instead, the plaintiff had complete access to all the information necessary to determine that an infringement had taken place, and he had simply not brought his cause of action within the applicable period.

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What Federal Jurisdiction Should Apply in the Lawsuit Concerning Dish Network’s Commercial-Skipping Television Broadcasting Capability

Dish Network is in a dispute with almost all of the major television networks over Dish Network’s offering to consumers that allows them to skip commercials in television shows.  The lawsuit is in its earliest stages.  The issue being decided now is what jurisdiction should hear the federal lawsuits. 

The reason that this has become such a tangled issue is because not only have CBS, NBC, Fox and Dish itself filed separate lawsuits, but Dish’s lawsuit was filed in New York while the others were filed in California (ABC has not yet filed suit).  This is important because New York case law would appear to favor the Dish Network’s position more than that of the networks.  

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When Does An Athlete Assume the Risk of Injury?

Better equipment, more health-conscious athletes and upgrades in technology have led many to believe that sports are safer today than in the past. But to what degree do athletes assume the risk of injury when they engage in sporting events? That was the question recently before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York. Bukowski v. Clarkson Univ.¸ 2011 NY Slip 5912, 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011).

The plaintiff (“Bukowski”) was a freshman pitcher on the Clarkson University (“Clarkson”) baseball team. While pitching from an artificial mound at regulation distance at practice, a batter hit a line drive that struck Bukowski in the face. He sued the University for Damages.        

During the trial, Bukowski testified that he was an experienced baseball player who was aware of the risk of being struck by a batted ball while pitching and that he had had an estimated 50 to 100 balls hit back at him during his career as a pitcher. He also testified that he was familiar with the indoor training facility where he was practicing when the injury occurred. Additionally, Bukowski confirmed that he had been informed by coaches that the live practices were going to be held without the use of an L-screen (a screen that pitchers stand behind for protection), and that prior to taking the mound that day at practice, he had observed other pitchers throwing batting practice without the use of an L-screen. The Supreme Court of New York granted Clarkson’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Bukowski had assumed the obvious risk of being hit by a line drive.         

On appeal, Bukowski argued that factual issues still needed to determine, including whether the risk of being hit by a ball was unreasonably enhanced by the backdrop and lighting of the facility and failure to use an L-screen. However, the Bukowski Court cited previous case law that established that organizers of sporting events owe a duty to exercise reasonable care and protect participants only “from injuries arising out of unassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased risks. Id. at 2 (citing Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 654 (1989)). The Court held that voluntary participants in sporting events are “deemed to have assumed commonly appreciated risks inherent in the activity” and that this assumption of the risk doctrine “extends to risks engendered by less than optimal conditions, provided that those conditions are open and obvious.” Id. at 2.         

Despite testimony by an expert that suggested that the use of an L-screen or a darker backdrop could have lessened the risk, the Court determined that the risk of a pitcher being hit by a ball is inherent in the sport of baseball. Id. Additionally, the conditions in which he was pitching were readily observable, so the Court held that such expert testimony was irrelevant. Id. Bukowski also argued that assumption of the risk is not a shield from liability when voluntariness is overcome by “the compulsion of a superior,” and that he did not ask to use an L-screen because he was told that was not part of the “Clarkson way” of practicing. Id. at 2, 3. However, the Court held that this argument only emphasized Bukowski’s knowledge of the risk while lending “no support to his assertion that his participation in the practice was compelled or involuntary.” Id.          

The Court’s decision in Bukowski underscores not only the dangers that athletes face when engaging in athletic activities, but the difficulty they will face in trying to recover damages from any injuries they suffer during those activities as well. Spectators of sporting events are also likely to face this high hurdle (see Falzon v. MLB Enterprises, et al.). Bukowski and other decisions support the idea that, even if technology has helped make sports safer, fundamental risks of injury still exist and courts will generally find that athletes voluntarily assume them.

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Can Sponsors Draft Agreements to Account For Potential Lockouts of Professional Sports Leagues?

Labor disputes caused a few professional sports leagues to call a timeout in 2011. For example, the National Football League locked out its players for nearly four months before the league and its players union agreed to a new collective bargaining agreement a little more than a month before the start of the 2011 season. Another example was the labor dispute involving the National Basketball Association.

The cancellation of games and the empty airtime on game nights presents a massive lost opportunity for companies that relied on these events as a means of advertising their product in front of millions of viewers. The legal questions this raises are complex, one of which is what provisions a business can incorporate into its sponsorship agreements with a league that will protect it in the event lockouts impair an originally scheduled professional sports season?

First, many sponsorship agreements include “force majeure” clauses. A force majeure clause generally excuses one party from failing to perform its contractual obligations due to an event that is beyond the non-performing party’s control. These clauses are commonly included in sponsorship agreements, but sponsors would be wise to also include language that incorporates a lockout or similar labor dispute in the definition of what constitutes force majeure. Specifically, the clause should address if and how long such a clause protects the league from its obligations to the sponsor and what the sponsor’s payment requirements are during such a period. The agreement’s language should also be broad enough to account for a variety of labor disputes that would impair the league’s ability to fulfill its obligations. Any definition of “labor dispute” should be broad enough to encompass (or should specifically enumerate) a lockout, strike, decertification, injunction or any other labor-related event that would preclude the scheduled games from being played.

Sponsors should also consider how any absence of games affects the sponsorship term to which the company and league agreed. For example, if an agreement between a soft drink company and a hockey league states that the agreement is to last for five years, and a one-year lockout falls within those five years, how does that affect the term of the agreement? One option would be for the sponsor to have the term that is lost due to a force majeure or similar event be suspended from the amount of time that is counted as completing the term of the agreement. Language could be inserted in the agreement that gives the sponsor the option of extending the agreement for a term that is commensurate with what was lost due to the labor dispute.

While sponsorship payments are generally not due during the offseason, the cancellation of regular season games can complicate what and when payment is due. A sponsor can negotiate into the agreement a reduction in the sponsorship fee for situations in which a labor dispute might postpone the regular season.  Since sponsors generally have to plan their advertising campaigns well in advance of the season, this sort of clause can help the sponsor avoid a situation in which it would be committed to regular payment despite a lack of games.

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Is a notice terminating a license to use a copyrighted composition sufficient to establish willful copyright infringement?

In a recent decision, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that evidence that a record company continued to sell records containing copyrighted compositions after receiving a notice terminating its compulsory licenses for failure to pay the required statutory royalties was sufficient to establish that the infringement was willful. EMI Entertainment World, Inc. v. Karen Records, Inc.  2011 WL 3795037, 1 (S.D.N.Y.,2011).

Plaintiff, EMI Entertainment World, Inc. is a music publisher and owns copyrights in the four musical compositions at issue in this case. EMI receives royalty payments for its compositions through Harry Fox Agency. Defendants are record companies owned by individual defendants Isabel Rodriguez and her husband Bienvenido Rodriguez. On Janurary 14, 2005, EMI filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement against the record company. Following discover, the Court granted partial summary judgment to EMI with respect to its claims of copyright infringement of the works for which royalty was not paid. However, the Court denied summary judgment to EMI for its claims for statutory damages for willful infringement. The Court requested the parties to submit supplemental evidence indicating the number of infringing sales that occurred during the time period for which damages were sought.

A plaintiff who successfully proves copyright infringement may request the court to award statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. §504(c) in addition to the award of actual damages and profits. “The Copyright Act affords a trial court ‘wide discretion … in setting the amount of statutory damages.’” Id at 2. In determining this amount, the trial court takes into account ‘the expenses saved and the profits reaped by the infringers’; ‘the revenues lost by the plaintiff’; ‘the value of the copyright’; ‘the potential for discouraging the defendant’ and ‘the deterrent effect on other besides the defendant.’ Id. In addition to these factors, it is also relevant to determine whether the defendants conduct was willful or innocent. To prove willful infringement under the Copyright Act, the plaintiff must show that the:

(1)             Defendant was actually aware of the infringing activity; or

(2)             Defendant’s actions were the result of the reckless disregard for, or willful blindness to, the copyright holder’s rights. Id. at 3.

In this case, EMI advanced three reasons for the Defendant’s willful infringement:

(1)             The individual defendants had extensive experience in the industry who owned ‘more than six hundred copyrighted sound recordings and musical compositions’. Id. at 4.

(2)             EMI’s prior suit against the Defendant’s with respect to other copyrights made the Defendant’s ‘well aware of the obligations to obtain mechanical licenses and pay statutory license fees for the use of others' musical compositions.’ Id at 5.

(3)             EMI’s letter to the Defendant’s put them on notice about the termination of its compulsory licenses for failure to pay the required statutory royalties. Id.

The Court held that EMI presented a strong circumstantial evidence of willfulness which warranted an award of enhanced statutory damages. The Court awarded EMI $25,000 in statutory damages for infringement of each composition.

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